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Abstract
We compare the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal In-
comes rules to divide a bundle of goods (heirlooms) or a bundle of bads (chores).
For goods the Competitive division fares better, as it is Resource Monotonic, and makes it
harder to strategically misreport preferences. But for bads, the Competitive rule, unlike the
Egalitarian one, is multivalued, harder to compute, and admits no continuous selection.
We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the Competitive rule based on the simple
formulation of Maskin Monotonicity under additive utilities.
1 Introduction
User-friendly platforms like SPLIDDIT, Adjusted Winner, or The Fair Division Calculator1 imple-
ment theoretical solutions to a variety of fair division problems, among them the classic distribution
of a bundle of divisible commodities (the “manna”). The key simplification is that these platforms
ask visitors to report linear preferences (additive utilities), instead of potentially complex Arrow-
Debreu preferences. Say we divide the family heirlooms: each participant on SPLIDDIT must
distribute 1000 points over the different objects, and these “bids” are interpreted as her fixed
marginal rates of substitution. Eliciting complementarities between these objects is potentially a
complex task with 6 objects, an outright impossible one with 10 or more, hence the design choice
of deliberately ignoring them. For the same reason combinatorial auction mechanisms never ask
buyers to report a ranking of all subsets of objects, ([2], [30], [6]). The proof of the pudding is in
the eating: visitors use these sites in the tens of thousands, fully aware of the interpretation of
their bids ([10]).
∗Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics is
gratefully acknowledged. Moulin thanks the Simmons institute for Theoretical Computing for its hospitality during
the Fall 2015. Sandomirskiy is partially supported by the grant 16-01-00269 of the Russian Foundation for Basic
Research. The comments of William Thomson on an earlier version have been especially useful.
1www.spliddit.org/; www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner/; www.math.hmc.edu/~su/fairdivision/calc/
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The two theoretical division rules used on the first two sites above are the Competitive Equilib-
rium with Equal Incomes (for short, Competitive) rule and the Egalitarian Equivalent (for short
Egalitarian) rule: see [29] and [19] respectively. The latter finds an efficient allocation where ev-
eryone is indifferent between his share and a common fraction of the entire manna. The former
identifies prices of the commodities and a common budget constraint at which the competitive
demands are feasible, and implement these demands. Here we critically compare the performance
of these two rules in the additive domain.
Fair division problems may involve bads (non disposable items generating disutility) as well
as goods (disposable, desirably commodities). For the former think of workers distributing tasks
(house chores, job shifts among substitutable workers ([4]) like teaching loads, babysitting, etc.),
cities sharing noxious facilities, managers allocating cuts in the company’s workforce between their
respective units, and so on. For the latter, the family heirlooms ([20]), the assets of divorcing
partners ([3]), office space between the colleagues, seats in overdemanded business school courses
([24], [5]), computing resources in peer-to-peer platforms ([9]), and so on.
If we divide goods both rules, Competitive and Egalitarian, are single-valued (utilitywise), easy
to compute, and vary continuously in the marginal utility parameters. This is clear for the latter
rule, and for the former one it follows from the celebrated Eisenberg-Gale theorem ([7], [22]): the
Competitive allocations also maximize the Nash product of utilities over all feasible allocations. We
invoke two normative properties to argue that the Competitive rule outperforms the Egalitarian
rule. One is the familiar Resource Monotonicity (RM), stating that an increase of the “good”
manna should improve at least weakly everyone’s welfare. The Competitive rule meets RM but
the Egalitarian does not.
The second axiom is new, though it can be traced to Maskin Monotonicity (see Subsection
5.3). Independence of Lost Bids (ILB) is predicated on the observation that, when utilities are
additive, at an efficient allocation most of the entries in the consumption matrix (specifying how
much each agent eats of each good) are zero. If agent i does not consume good a at all, we call his
marginal utility uia a “lost bid”. ILB states that changing i’s lost bid uia should have no effect on
the outcome, as long this bid remains lost. This property has important incentives consequences.
Recall that, even in the additive domain,no reasonable division rule (e. g., treating equals equally)
can be both efficient and strategyproof ([21]). A consequence of ILB is that an agent cannot benefit
by a small misreport of her lost bids. The Competitive rule meets ILB: it is still vulnerable to
misreports of one’s winning bids, but the profitable direction of misreports depends upon the entire
problem, so it requires a fair amount of information. By contrast, the Egalitarian rule fails ILB,
and the (small) profitable misreports are entirely clear: one should inflate lost bids and deflate
winning bids: Lemma 4 in Subsection 5.3.
Combined with efficiency and symmetry properties, ILB characterizes the Competitive division
rule.
Turning to the division of bads we find, somewhat surprisingly, that the Competitive rule is
much harder to handle. The main difficulty is that we may have many different competitive utility
profiles, even exponentially many in (the smallest of) the number of bads and of agents (Subsection
5.4). There is no obvious way to deal with this embarrassing multiplicity. In particular every
selection of the Competitive correspondence is discontinuous in the parameters (marginal utilities)
of the economy, and this is also true of any selection of the much larger correspondence of efficient
and Envy Free allocations. The (long) proof uses the fact that the set of efficient and envy-free
allocations, and the corresponding disutility profiles, can have close to 23n connected components.
Finally, computing the competitive allocations of bads is not a convex optimization problem as
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in the case of goods, and with more than two agents we do not know of any efficient algorithms
discovering them.
By contrast the Egalitarian rule to divide bads is the mirror image of the rule for goods, and
shares the same properties: it is single-valued and continuous in the utility parameters (as well as
in the manna). We conclude that the Egalitarian is a more practical approach to the division of
bads than the Competitive one, or any Envy-Free single-valued rule.
Contents After the literature review in Section 2, the model is defined in Section 3, and our
two division rules in Section 4. Section 5 contains our normative comparison of the two rules.
The Egalitarian rule ensures to each agent strictly more than her Fair Share utility or disutility
(Subsection 5.1). The Competitive rule for goods is Resource Monotonic (Subsection 5.2), and
satisfies Independence of Lost Bids (subsection 5.3). We divide bads in the last two Subsections:
we discuss successively the multiplicity issue (5.4) then the discontinuity issue (5.5). All substantial
proofs are in Section 6.
2 Related literature
1. Our main motivation is the recent stream of work in algorithmic mechanism design on the
fair division of goods, recognizing the practical convenience of additive utilities and the conceptual
advantages of the Competitive solution. For instance in the same model as here, Megiddo and
Vazirani ([15]) show that the Competitive utility profile depends continuously upon the rates of
substitution and the total endowment; Jain and Vazirani ([13]) that it is can be computed in time
polynomial in the dimension n+ p of the problem.
Steinhaus’ 1948 “cake-division” model ([25]), also assumes linear preferences represented by
atomless measures over, typically, a compact euclidean set. It contains our model for goods as the
special case where the measures are piecewise constant. Sziklai and Segal-Halevi ([23]) show that
the Eisenberg-Gale Theorem still holds, and that the Competitive rule is Resource Monotonic (see
the Remark in Subsection 6.3).
2. In the companion paper [1] we consider the more general problem of dividing a “mixed
manna” containing both goods and bads, as when we dissolve a partnership with both valuable
assets and liabilities. Our first observation is that the Egalitarian rule is no longer well defined,
because there may be no efficient allocation where everybody is indifferent to consuming a common
fraction of the entire manna (or of any common benchmark bundle). So the competitive rule wins
our contest by default.
The main message of [1] is that mixed manna problems are of two types. If goods overwhelm
bads2 the Competitive rule behaves just like an all goods problem: it picks a maximizes the product
of utilities, yields a unique utility profile, is resource monotonic and continuous. But if instead
bads overwhelm goods we are back to the potentially messy situation of an all bads problems with
a host of different competitive divisions and no continuous selection from this set.
3. Four decades earlier, the microeconomic literature on the fair division of private goods
insisted on working in the much larger domain of Arrow-Debreu preferences, where the relation
between the Nash product of utilities and the Competitive rule is lost, and provided several ax-
iomatic characterizations of the latter. The most popular result appears first in Hurwicz ([12]) and
2In the sense that some feasible division of the manna gives everyone a positive utility.
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Gevers ([8]), and is refined by Thomson ([27]) and Nagahisa ([18]): any efficient and Pareto indif-
ferent rule meeting (some variants of) Maskin Monotonicity (MM) must contain the Competitive
rule. Our Independence of Lost Bids axiom is in fact a weak variant of MM for the linear domain,
and the proof of our characterization result (Proposition 3) mimics the standard argument.
3 Division problems and division rules
The finite set of agents is N with generic element i, and |N | = n ≥ 2. The finite set of divisible
items is A with generic element a and |A| = p ≥ 2. The manna consists of one unit of each item.
We assume the manna contains either only goods, or only bads, and we use the same notation for
both types of problems.
Agent i’s allocation (or share) is zi ∈ [0, 1]A; the profile z = (zi)i∈N is a feasible allocation if∑
N zi = e
A, the vector in RA+ with all coordinates equal to 1. The set of feasible allocations is
Φ(N,A).
Each agent is endowed with linear preferences over [0, 1]A, represented by a vector ui ∈ RA+, a
utility function in the case of goods, a disutility function in that of bads. We use the generic term
utility∗ for both cases, which will generate no confusion. Only the underlying preferences matter:
for any λ > 0, ui and λui carry the same information. This restriction is formally included in
Definition 1 below.
Given an allocation z we write agent i’s corresponding utility∗ as Ui = ui · zi =
∑
A uiazia.
Clearly a “null agent” (∀a : uia = 0) can be ignored when we divide goods. When we divide
bads, the problem is trivial if there is a null agent (U = 0 is feasible and uniquely efficient). Thus
we only look at problems where all agents are non null. Moreover if we divide bads, the vector
U = 0 is feasible if (and only if) each bad is harmless to at least one agent (∀a∃i : uia = 0): such
problems are also trivial and we also rule them out in the Definitions below.
Similarly if item a gives uia = 0 for all i, it is a “useless good” or a “harmless bad” that can
be ignored as well. Our Competitive rule to divide bads goes one step further: it will also ignore
a bad a harmless to some agents, and give no credit to these agents for eating a. See Definition 4.
Definition 1
A division problem is a triple Q = (N,A, u) where u ∈ RN×A+ is such that the N ×A matrix [uia]
has no null row, no null column, and in the case of bads there is at least one column with no null
entry.
We write Ψ(Q) for the set of feasible utility∗ profiles, and Ψeff (Q)for its subset of efficient utility∗
profiles. i. e., the North East frontier of Ψ(Q) if we divide goods, and its SouthWest frontier if
we divide bads.
The structure of efficient allocations in the linear domain is key to several of our results. Given
z ∈ Φ(N,A) we define the N ×A-bipartite consumption graph Γ(z) = {(i, a)|zia > 0}.
Lemma 1
a) Fix a problem Q = (N,A, u). If U ∈ Ψeff (Q) there is some z ∈ Φ(N,A) representing U
such that Γ(z) is a forest (an acyclic graph). For such allocation z the matrix [zia] has at least
(n− 1)(p− 1) zeros.
b) Fixing N,A, on an open dense subset U∗(N,A) of matrices u ∈ RN×A+ , every efficient utility∗
profile U ∈ Ψeff (N,A, u) is achieved by a single allocation z.
See in Subsection 1 the definition of U∗(N,A) and the proof of Lemma 1.
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We use two equivalent definitions of a division rule, in terms of utility∗ profiles, or of feasible
allocations. As this will cause no confusion, we use the “division rule” terminology in both cases.
When we rescale each ui as λiui the new profile is written λ ∗ u.
Definition 2
i) A division rule F associates to every problem Q = (N,A, u) a set of utility∗ profiles F (Q) ⊂
Ψ(Q). Moreover F (N,A, λ ∗ u) = λ ∗ F (N,A, λ ∗ u) for any rescaling λ with λi > 0 for all i.
ii) A division rule f associates to every problem Q = (N,A, u) a subset f(Q) of Φ(N,A) such
that for any z, z′ ∈ Φ(N,A):
{z ∈ f(Q) and ui · zi = ui · z′i for all i ∈ N} =⇒ z′ ∈ f(Q) (1)
Moreover f(N,A, λ ∗ u) = f(Q) for any rescaling λ where λi > 0 for all i.
The one-to-one mapping from F to f is clear. Definition 2 makes no distinction between two
allocations with identical welfare consequences, a property often called Pareto-Indifference.
We speak of a single-valued division rule if F (Q) is a singleton for all Q, otherwise the rule is
multi-valued. Single-valued rules are much more appealing, as they eschew the further negotiation
required to converge on a single division.
4 Two division rules
The definition of the Egalitarian rule goes back to Pazner and Schmeidler ([19]), who introduced it
as a welfarist alternative to the competitive approach. In our context we first normalize utilities∗
so that eating the entire pile of items (goods or bads) gives a utility∗ of 1 to each participant, then
find an efficient utility profile where normalized utilities∗ are equal.
We call a problem Q in Definition 1 normalized if ui ·eA = 1 for all i. Because division rules are
invariant to rescaling, it is enough to define such a rule F on the subdomain of normalized division
problems: if Q = (N,A, u) is not normalized we simply set F (Q) = F (N,A, u˜) where u˜i = 1ui·eAui
for all i.
Interestingly the definition of the Egalitarian rule is simpler when we divide bads rather than
goods. In the case of bads there is always a (unique) efficient normalized utility profile such that
Uegi = U
eg
j for all i, j, which the rule selects. Not so in the case of goods. Consider for instance
three agents and two goods a, b where agent 1 likes only a while agents 2, 3 like only b. Efficiency
implies that agent 1 eats a and U1 = 1, while at least one of 2, 3 gets Ui ≤ 12 . In this example the
Egalitarian rule naturally splits b equally between 2 and 3.
In the case of goods we must use a familiar ordering of utility profiles. For any U ∈ RN+ , let
U∗ ∈ Rn+ be the vector with the same coordinates arranged increasingly, and recall that the leximin
ordering lxcompares U and U ′ as the lexicographic ordering of Rn+ compares U∗ and U ′∗. The
leximin ordering has a unique maximum on every convex compact of RN+ (see e.g. [16]).
Definition 3 Fix a normalized problem Q = (N,A, u).
i) If we divide goods,the Egalitarian division rule F eg picks the utility profile Ueg maximizing the
leximin ordering in Ψ(Q).
ii) If we divide bads,the Egalitarian division rule F eg picks the efficient utility profile Ueg such
that Uegi = U
eg
j for all i, j.
We check that the Definition ii) makes sense. Set θ = minΨ(Q) maxi Ui and pick U in Ψ(Q)
achieving θ. Note that θ is positive. Suppose U1 < θ: then for any i ≥ 2 such that ui · zi = θ
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we take a small amount of some a such that uia > 0 and zia > 0, and give it to agent 1. If
these amounts are small enough, we get an allocation z′ where ui · z′i < θ for all i, including 1,
contradicting the definition of θ. Thus U i = θ for all i. Now check that U is efficient by a similar
argument: if there is some z ∈ Φ(N,A) such that ui ·zi ≤ θ for all i and u1 ·z1 < θ, we can transfer
some bads from any agent i such that ui · zi = θ to agent 1, and contradict again the definition of
θ.
Definition 4 Fix a problem Q = (N,A, u).
i) If we divide goods we call the allocation z ∈ Φ(N,A) competitive if there is a price p ∈ RA+ such
that
∑
A pa = n and
zi ∈ arg max
yi∈RA+
{ui · yi|p · yi ≤ 1} for all i (2)
ii) If we divide bads we call the allocation z ∈ Φ(N,A) competitive if there is a price p ∈ RA+ such
that
∑
A pa = n and
zi ∈ arg min
yi∈RA+
{ui · yi|p · yi ≥ 1} for all i (3)
and for all a ∈ A
pa = 0 if uia = 0 for some i ∈ N (4)
In the case of goods this Definition implies U  0 because each row ui is non null and agent i
can afford some amount of a good he likes. Inequality U  0 holds for bads as well because agent
i must buy some bads with a positive price, and by (4) he dislikes such bads.
We write the Competitive rule as f c, F c: it selects all competitive allocations or utility∗ profiles.
Existence of such allocations both for goods and for bads is well known, as explained in the
companion paper [1].
Property (4) rules out inefficient solutions of system (3). For example assume two bads, two
agents and
a b
u1 2 1
u2 0 1
There are three solutions of (3)
a b
z1 1/4 1
z2 3/4 0
p 4/3 2/3
;
a b
z1 0 1/2
z2 1 1/2
p 0 2
;
a b
z1 0 1
z2 1 0
p 1 1
The left one is inefficient, and (4) rules out the right one (though it is efficient).
We give two additional characterizations of competitive allocations, critical to most of our
results. The first one is a simple and intuitive system of inequalities.
Lemma 2 Fix a problem Q = (N,A, u). Then U ∈ F c(Q) if and only if:
i) Case of goods: U  0 and U = (ui · zi)i∈N for some z ∈ Φ(N,A) such that for all i ∈ N
for all a ∈ A: zia > 0 =⇒ {uia
Ui
≥ uja
Uj
for all j ∈ N} (5)
ii) Case of bads: U  0 and U = (ui · zi)i∈N for some z ∈ Φ(N,A) such that for all i ∈ N
for all a ∈ A: zia > 0 =⇒ {uia
Ui
≤ uja
Uj
for all j ∈ N} (6)
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The next result is a geometric representation of competitive allocations. Given Q we call U
a critical point of the Nash product N (U) = Πi∈NUi in Ψ(Q) if U ∈ Ψ(Q), U  0, and the
hyperplane supporting the upper contour of N at U supports Ψ(Q) as well. Such critical points
include the strictly positive local maxima and local minima of N in Ψ(Q).
Proposition 1 Fix a problem Q = (N,A, u).
i) If we divide goods the Competitive utility profile F c(Q) is the unique maximizer of the Nash
product in Ψ(Q).
ii) If we divide bads the Competitive disutility profiles in F c(Q) are exactly all the critical points
of the Nash product N in Ψeff (Q).
Statement i) is well known and goes back to Eisenberg and Gale ([7]). A more general version
of statement ii) is proven in [1], to which we refer the reader.
A consequence of Definition 3 and Proposition 1 is that both rules F eg, F c are “welfarist”, in
the sense that the utility profiles they choose are entirely determined by the set of feasible utilities.
5 Comparing the two rules
5.1 Fair Share Guarantee
The mild and compelling test known as Fair Share Guarantee already appears in the early cake
division literature. The idea is to take the possibly inefficient equal division of the resources (where
each agent receives 1ne
A) as the default option that each participant can (virtually) enforce, thus
setting a lower bound on individual welfare.
Fair Share Guarantee (FSG) for any Q and any U ∈ F (Q) we have
Ui ≥ 1
n
ui · eA (goods); Ui ≤ 1
n
ui · eA (bads)
Clearly both rules F eg and F cmeet FSG. However only the former meets the following strict version
of FSG.
Strict Fair Share Guarantee (SFSG) if in Q the equal split allocation is efficient, then
Ui =
1
nui · eA for all i; if it is not we have, for any U ∈ F (Q)
Ui >
1
n
ui · eA (goods); Ui < 1
n
ui · eA (bads)
Lemma 3 The Egalitarian rule meets SFSG; the Competitive rule does not if we have at least two
agents and/or at least two items.
The SFSG test reveals a weakness of the Competitive rule that the Egalitarian rule does not
share.
That the Egalitarian rule meets SFSG is clear if we divide bads, by statement ii) in Definition
3. In order to prove it when we divide goods, fix a problem Q and partition the agents as follows
Uegi =
1
n
ui · eA for i ∈ N0 ; Uegi >
1
n
ui · eA for i ∈ N+
If equal split is not efficient the set N+ is non empty; suppose N0 is non empty as well and derive
a contradiction. Take any good a and agent i in N+ such that zia > 0 and uia > 0: if some j in N0
likes a as well, we can improve the utility profile for the leximin ordering by transferring a little a
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from i to j. Therefore nobody in N0 likes any of the goods eaten by N+, so by splitting equally
the goods that agents in N0 like among themselves, they each get
1
|N0|ui · eA which is the desired
contradiction.
We illustrate the second statement by two examples. In the first one we have two agents and
two items; the Competitive division is unique, whether the matrix u represent utilities for goods
or disutilities for bads:
a b
u1 10 6
u2 5 1
for goods: zc =
a b
z1 1/5 1
z2 4/5 0
p 5/4 3/4
for bads: zc =
a b
z1 3/5 0
z2 2/5 1
p 5/3 1/3
The corresponding utilities and disutilities, illustrated in Figure 1, are: for goods: U c = (8, 4),
Ueg = (9 17 , 3
3
7 ); and for bads: U
c = (6, 3), Ueg = (6 67 , 2
4
7 ).
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Figure 1: For the first example with goods the red circle and the red square represent the compet-
itive and egalitarian utility profiles, respectively. Gray point is the equal split utility profile. Blue
points are for the case of bads.
Our second example is a problem with goods with n agents and (n−1) goods, where F c violates
SFSG. In this canonical problem the contrast between our two rules is especially stark. We have n
agents and (n− 1) goods. The first (n− 1) agents are single-minded : agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, likes
only good ai. The last agent n is flexible, he likes all goods equally
good a1 a2 · · · an−1
u1 1 0 0 0
u2 0 1 0 0
· · · 0 0 1 0
un−1 0 0 0 1
un 1 1 1 1
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The competitive price is nn−1 for every good: each single-minded agent buys
n−1
n units of “his”
good while the flexible agent n eats 1n -th of each good
zi =
n− 1
n
eai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 ; zn = 1
n
eA (7)
This is tough on the flexible agent who gets his fair share and no more, while everybody else gets
(n− 1) times more! The reason is that in this example the Competitive allocation is the only one
in the core from equal split: the coalition of all single-minded agents does not need agent n to
achieve its competitive surplus.
The Egalitarian rule splits each good i equally between agent i and agent n, and everyone ends
up with a share worth one half of the entire manna, much above her Fair Share.
zi =
1
2
eai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 ; zn = 1
2
eA
Here we submit that the Egalitarian allocation above gives too much to agent n, who gets (much)
more than his fair share of every good. By contrast at a Competitive allocation, here and always,
everyone gets at most a 1n -th share of at least one good: for all i we have mina∈A zia ≤ 1n .3
For fixed sizes of N and A it would be interesting to understand at which problems the `∞ or `1
distance between the profiles of normalized utilities at the competitive and egalitarian allocations,
is the largest possible. The canonical example may be a step toward the answer.
5.2 Resource Monotonicity
More goods or fewer bads to divide should be good news (at least weakly) for everyone: all agents
“own” the goods/bads equally and welfare should be comonotonic to ownership. This general
solidarity property has played a major role in the modern fair division literature: [17], [26]. When
it fails someone has an incentive to sabotage the discovery of additional goods.
In the following definition B is a subset of A and we write u[B] for the restriction to RN×B+ of
the utility∗ matrix u ∈ RN×A+ .
Resource Monotonicity (RM): for any two problems Q =(N,A, u) and Q′=(N,B, u[B])
where B ⊂ A, we have
for any U ∈ F (Q), U ′ ∈ F (Q′): U ′ ≤ U (goods) ; U ≤ U ′ (bads) (8)
(going from A to B is bad news if we deal with goods, and good news with bads).
Proposition 2
i) If we divide goods, the Competitive rule is Resource Monotonic. For three or more agents the
Egalitarian rule is not.
ii) If we divide bads among three or more agents and two or more bads, no efficient rule can meet
Resource Monotonicity and Fair Share Guarantee.4
3If zia >
1
n
for all a the competitive price must be parallel to ui (or eating of each good would not be a
competitive demand) and the equal budget condition p · zi = p · ( 1n eA) gives ui · zi = ui · ( 1n eA), contradiction. If
we divide bads every Competitive allocation satisfies similarly maxa∈A zia ≥ 1n .
4Note that we sketch the proof of statement ii) in Subsection 7.2 of [1]. We provide here the complete proof in
Subsection 6.3.
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Recall from [17] (see also [28]) that in any domain containing the Leontief preferences, we
cannot divide goods efficiently while ensuring FSG and RM (this is true even with two agents and
two goods). This makes the contrast of goods versus bads in the additive domain all the more
intriguing.
Proposition 2 gives a strong argument in support of the Competitive rule when we divide goods,
but also shows that this advantage disappears when we divide bads.
The proof that F c meets RM for goods is in Subsection 6.3. We give here a three agent example
showing that F eg fails RM: this example illustrates well the logic of the Egalitarian division of
goods. It is easy to show that F eg meets RM in two agent problems.
We compare the two problems below with B = {a, b, c} and A = {a, b, c, d}
Q(B) =
a b c
u1 3 1 1
u2 1 3 1
u3 1 1 3
; Q(A) =
a b c d
u1 3 1 1 0
u2 1 3 1 4
u3 1 1 3 4
Problem Q(B) is symmetric. Any efficient and symmetric rule allocates goods “diagonally”:
agent 1 gets all of a and so on; normalized utilities are 35 . In Q(A) the natural idea is to keep
the same allocation of a, b, c and divide d equally between agents 2 and 3, because agent 1 does
not care for d. This is what F c recommends (prices are (1, 35 ,
3
5 ,
4
5 )). But the normalized utilities
at this allocation are ( 35 ,
5
9 ,
5
9 ), so the F
eg must compensate agents 2, 3 for the loss in normalized
utilities caused by the gain of some new good! Equality is restored at the allocation
zeg =
a b c d
55/59 0 0 0
2/59 1 0 1/2
2/59 0 1 1/2
where agent 1’s welfare has decreased.
5.3 Independence of lost bids and local misreports
By a local misreport of one’s preferences, we mean that a change of report that does not affect the
consumption forest Γ(z) identified in Lemma 1. For example the utility matrix u is in U∗(N,A)
(Subsection 6.1) so that this forest does not change in a neighborhood of u.
We call agent i’s marginal utility uia her “bid” for item a; given a problem Q = (N,A, u) we
say that i’s bid is “losing” if zia = 0, and “winning” if if zia = 1.
Under the Egalitarian rule dividing goods, a profitable local manipulation is to inflate my losing
bids and deflate my winning bids; if we divide bads, I want instead to inflate my winning bids
and deflate the losing ones. This is the familiar bargaining tactic of playing down the worth on
your concession (my share) while exaggerating that of my concession (your share). For instance in
problem Q(A) of the previous section, if agent 1 reports u′1a = 52 instead of u1a = 3 (or increases
both u′1b ans u
′
1c to
6
5 ) the apparent egalitarian allocation z
′ becomes the competitive allocation
(at u) where she eats all a.
Given a problem Q = (N,A, u) with goods with a single egalitarian allocation z = feg(u), we
call u′i a simple misreport by agent i if we have for all a ∈ A
zia = 0 =⇒ u′ia ≥ uia ; zia = 1 =⇒ u′ia ≤ uia ; 0 < zia < 1 =⇒ u′ia = uia (9)
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and at least one inequality is strict. In a problem Q with bads, the same definition applies upon
changing the sign of the inequalities.
Lemma 4
Fix Q and a simple misreport u′i as above. If feg(u′i, u−i) = z′, and Γ(z′) = Γ(z) the misreport
is profitable
goods: ui · z′i > ui · zi ; bads: ui · z′i < ui · zi
The impact of local misreports on competitive allocations is very different. Lowering or raising
a losing bid has no impact at all on the entire allocation. This is clear from Lemma 2. Fix a goods
problem Q, with z = f c(u) and the competitive price p. Then the utility maximization (2) implies
uia
Ui
≤ pa for all a, with equality if a ∈ [zi]. Therefore if i changes her losing bid uia to any u′ia
such that
u′ia
Ui
≤ pa, the allocation z is still in f c(u′i, u−i) (system (5) still holds) so the misreport
is of no consequence to anybody. The same argument applies if we divide bads: if z ∈ f c(u) and
i changes her losing bid uia to u
′
ia, the allocation z remains in f
c(u′i, u−i) as long as inequality
u′ia
Ui
≥ pa is preserved.
There is an incentive aspect to this invariance property: to misreport on an item that I do
not end up consuming is “cheap”, because it is presumably harder to verify ex post my marginal
utility∗ for that item than for an item I am actually eating.
Of course the Competitive rule is manipulable by misreporting winning bids, whether we divide
goods or bads. But unlike for the Egalitarian rule, whether a profitable manipulation is to increase
or decrease a winning bid does depend upon the entire utility matrix.For instance in the three
agents, two goods problem
a b
u1 3 1
u2 α 1
u3 1 3
where
1
2
< α < 2 =⇒ zc =
a b
z1 (1 + α
−1)/3 0
z2 (2− α−1)/3 (2− α−1)/3
z3 0 (1 + α
−1)/3
the optimal misreport of u2a = α is u
′
2a =
√
α, hence it can be above or below the true winning
bid α.
Definition 5 The rule f is Independent of Lost Bids (ILB) if for any two problems Q,Q′ on N,A
where u, u′ differ only in the entry ia, and such that uia > u′ia (goods) or uia < u
′
ia (bads), we
have
∀z ∈ f(Q) : zia = 0 =⇒ z ∈ f(Q′) (10)
Equal Treatment of Equals (ETE) is the familiar requirement that the rule F should not
discriminate between two agents with identical characteristics. For all Q and i, j ∈ N
ui = uj =⇒ Ui = Uj for all U ∈ F (Q)
Proposition 3 (goods or bads)
If a division rule meets Efficiency, Independence of Lost Bids, and at least one of Equal Treatment
of Equals and Fair Share Guaranteed, it contains the Competitive rule.
The Competitive rule for goods is characterized by adding single-valuedness to the above re-
quirements.
We show after the proof (Subsection 6.5) that ILB is a strictly weaker requirement than Maskin
Monotonicity ([14]) in the linear domain. This relates Proposition 3 to earlier results mentioned
in Section 2.
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We discuss the tightness of our characterization.
Drop ETE and FSG. An asymmetric variant of the competitive solution, where fixed income shares
replace equal income shares, is efficient and meets ILB. See Remark 1 in Section 3 of [1].
Drop ILB. The Egalitarian rule meets the other three axioms.
Drop Efficiency. It is tempting to consider the simple Equal Split rule, dividing all items equally
irrespective of preferences. However by Definition 2 we must also select all allocations generating
the same utility profile, and this correspondence violates ILB. But a constrained version of the
Competitive rule, where we restrict individual consumptions as in the assignment model of [11]
(i. e.,
∑
A zia =
1
n |A| for all i), satisfies ETE and ILB by the same reasoning as in unconstrained
problems.
5.4 Multiple Competitive divisions
When we divide goods, both rules pick a unique utility profile, and both are easy to compute,
respectively by a linear or convex optimization program. This remains true for the Egalitarian rule
dividing bads, but not for the Competitive rule.
In all numerical examples of bads problems discussed so far (in Section 4 and subsections
5.1, 5.2) the Competitive rule was single valued. The simplest illustration of the unpalatable
multiplicity issue has two agents and two bads:
a b
u1 1 2
u2 3 1
zc1 =
a b
z1 1 1/4
z2 0 3/4
p 2/3 4/3
zc2 =
a b
z1 1 0
z2 0 1
p 1 1
zc3 =
a b
z1 2/3 0
z2 1/3 1
p 3/2 1/2
See Figure 2. Note that at zc1 agent 1 gets only his Fair Share utility level, while agent 2 grabs
all the surplus above equal split; at zc3 agents 1 and 2 exchange roles.
Our second example has the same structure as the canonical example concluding Subsection
5.1. We have n agents, (n − 1) bads, and the first (n − 1) agents are single-minded, each over a
different bad
bad a1 a2 · · · an−1
u1 1 3 3 3
u2 3 1 3 3
· · · 3 3 1 3
un−1 3 3 3 1
un 1 1 1 1
The allocation (7), respecting the symmetry between the first n− 1 agents, is still competitive
at the uniform price nn−1 for each bad: the flexible agent n gets no relief from his equal split share.
However there are many more competitive divisions, all with different utility profiles, and breaking
at least partially the above symmetry.
Recall the notation eS for the vector in RA with eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and zero otherwise. Pick an
integer q, 1 ≤ q ≤ n− 1 and check that the allocation
zi =
q
q + 1
eai for 1 ≤ i ≤ q ; zj = eaj for q + 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 ; zn = 1
q + 1
e{a1,··· ,aq} (11)
is competitive for the prices pai =
q+1
q for 1 ≤ i ≤ q and paj = 1 for q+1 ≤ j ≤ n−1. In particular
agent n’s disutility varies from 12 to
n−1
n . We could have chosen any other subset of bads with size
q, and any q from 1 to n− 1. Thus there are 2n−1 − 1 different competitive allocations.
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Figure 2: The unique competitive utility profile for goods (red) and multiple profiles for bads (blue).
The gray dot corresponds to the equal split utility profile.
Note that by ILB (Definition 5) the entries 3 in the disutility matrix play almost no role in the
computation above: replacing those entries by any γ larger than 2 does not affect the competitive
divisions. By contrast the (unique and symmetric) Egalitarian allocation depends heavily upon γ:
agent n’s disutility decreases to zero as γ grows to infinity.
Our first main result evaluates the extent of the multiplicity issue.
Theorem 1 For any problem Q with bads:
i) The set F c(Q) of competitive utility profiles is finite.
ii) For general n = |N |,m = |A|, |F c(Q)| can be as high as 2min{n,m} − 1 if n 6= m, and 2n−1 − 1
if n = m.
iii) For n = 2 the upper bound on |F c(Q)| is 2m− 1.
iv) For m = 2 the upper bound on |F c(Q)| is 2n− 1.
There is a simple exponential upper bound on the number of distinct Competitive allocations
for general n,m. For a given consumption graph Γ, there is at most one competitive allocation
(utilitywise): the graph determines the set of active KKT constraints, and we can recover the
allocation from Lemma 2. Thus |F c(Q)| cannot exceed the number of bipartite forests on n + m
vertices, which is bounded by 2(n+m) ln(nm).5
The canonical example before Theorem 1 proves half of statement ii). The longer proofs of
statements iii) and iv) rely on the fact that for n = 2 a problem is entirely described by the
sequence of ratios u1au2a , and for m = 2 by the sequence of ratios
uia
uib
. This allows a closed form
description of all competitive allocations.
5Because we know that there are at least m and at most n+m− 1 edges in the graph and there are nm options
to trace each edge.
13
A by-product of these proofs is that |F c(Q)| is odd on an open dense subset of the problems
where n = 2 and/or m = 2. A very plausible conjecture is that this is true as well for any n,m.
5.5 Single-valued envy free rules: discontinuity
In order to bypass the unpalatable multiplicity issue just discussed we must identify a normatively
appealing single-valued selection from the set of Competitive divisions of bads. For instance if the
problem involves only two agents and/or two bads, the set of efficient and envy-free allocations is
a one-dimensional line (as explained in the proof of Theorem 1) with, generically, an odd number
of competitive allocations, so we can choose the median allocation. Alternatively, in problems of
any size we can pick among efficient allocations the one maximizing the product of disutilities: it
is competitive and generically unique (Lemmas 3, 4 in Section 6 of [1]). But no such selection can
meet the following compelling regularity requirement.
Continuity (CONT) of the single-valued division rule F . For all N , A, the function u →
F (N,A, u) is continuous in RN×A++ .
The Egalitarian rule to divide goods or bads, and the (single-valued) Competitive rule to divide
goods, are clearly continuous. But no selection of the Competitive rule to divide bads is continuous.
We deduce this negative result from a much more general statement involving a familiar test of
fairness.
No Envy (NE) of the possibly multivalued rule f . For all Q and all i, j ∈ N
for any z ∈ f(Q): ui · zi ≥ ui · zj (goods); ui · zi ≤ ui · zj (bads)
No Envy ensures equality of opportunity “ex post” (after we cut the cake), just like a com-
petitive allocation offers equality of opportunity “ex ante” (the common budget set). As is well
known the set of efficient and envy-free allocations contains much more than the competitive ones.
For instance with two agents, it contains all efficient allocations guaranteeing Fair Shares. It is
therefore surprising, and disappointing that in the division of bads even this fairly permissive test
is incompatible with Continuity.
Theorem 2 Say we divide at least two bads between at least four agents and fix a division rule
f, F . If F is single-valued and Continuous, then f cannot be also Efficient and Envy-Free.
The statement is tight. A single-valued selection of F c is such that the corresponding selection
of f c is Efficient and Envy-free. The rule F eg is Efficient and Continuous. Finally the rule
derived from the equal division of all bads, irrespective of disutility functions,6 is Envy-Free and
Continuous.
We prove Theorem 2 as a Corollary of Proposition 4, our last result. There we focus on the
topological structure of the set A of efficient and envy-free allocations in problems with two bads
a, b, and any number of agents.
Proposition 4 If we divide at least two bads between at least three agents, there are problems
Q where the set A of efficient and envy-free allocations, and the corresponding set of disutility
profiles, have b 2n+13 c connected components.
The set A is clearly connected if all problems with two agents, whether we divide goods or
bads. In a general problem with goods, we do not know if the set A is always connected.
6Defined by f(Q) = {z ∈ Φ(N,A)|ui · zi = 1nui · eA}, to meet Pareto indifference.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
6.1 Lemma 1
6.1.1 a) the consumption forest at efficient allocations
Fix a problem Q. To fix ideas we think of the items as goods but the proof is identical for bads.
Pick z representing U ∈ Ψeff (Q) and assume there is a K-cycle in Γ(z): zkak , zkak−1 > 0 for
k = 1, · · · ,K, where a0 = aK . Then ukak , ukak−1 are positive for all k: if ukak = 0 efficiency and∑
i∈N uiak > 0 imply zkak = 0.
Assume now
u1a1
u2a1
· u2a2
u3a2
· · · · · u(K−1)aK−1
uKaK−1
· uKaK
u1aK
> 1 (12)
Then we can pick arbitrarily small positive numbers εk such that
u1a1 · ε1
u1aK · εK
> 1,
u2a2 · ε2
u2a1 · ε1
> 1, · · · , uKaK · εK
uKaK−1 · εK−1
> 1 (13)
and the corresponding transfer to each agent k of εk units of good k against εk−1 units of good
k − 1 is a Pareto improvement, contradiction. Therefore (12) is impossible; the opposite strict
inequality is similarly ruled out so we conclude
u1a1
u2a1
· u2a2
u3a2
· · · · · u(K−1)aK−1
uKaK−1
· uKaK
u1aK
= 1 (14)
Now if we perform a transfer as above where
u1a1 · ε1
u1aK · εK
=
u2a2 · ε2
u2a1 · ε1
= · · · = uKaK · εK
uKaK−1 · εK−1
= 1
the utility profile U is unchanged. If we choose the numbers εk as large as possible for feasibility,
this will bring at least one entry (k, ak) or (k, ak−1) to zero, so in our new representation z′ of U
the graph Γ(z′) has fewer edges. We can clearly repeat this operation until we eliminate all cycles
of Γ(z).
The last statement follows at once from the fact that a forest with n+m vertices contains at
most n+m− 1 edges.
6.1.2 b) at almost all profiles each efficient utility profile is achieved by a single
allocation
We let U∗(N,A) be the open and dense subset of RN×A+ such that for any cycle
C = {1, a1, 2, a2, · · · , aK , 1} in the complete bipartite graph N ×A we have pi(C) = u1a1u2a1 ·
u2a2
u3a2
· · · · ·
u(K−1)aK−1
uKaK−1
· uKaKu1aK 6= 1 ((14) fails) and moreover uia > 0 for all i, a. It is clearly an open dense
subset of RN×A+ .
We pick a problem Q with u ∈ RN×A+ , fix U ∈ Ψeff (Q) and assume there are two different
z, z′ ∈ Φ(N,A) such that u · z = u · z′ = U . Pick a pair 1, a1 such that z1a1 > z′1a1 . Because a1 is
eaten in full there is some agent 2 such that z2a1 < z
′
2a1 and because u2 · z2 = u2 · z′2 there is some
good a2 such that z2a2 > z
′
2a2 . Continuing in this fashion we build a sequence 1, a1, 2, a2, 3, a3, · · · ,
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such that {zkak−1 < z′kak−1 and zkak > z′kak} for all k ≥ 2. This sequence must cycle, i. e., we
must reach K, aK such that zKaK > z
′
KaK
and zk˜aK < z
′
k˜aK
for some k˜, 1 ≤ k˜ ≤ K − 1. Without
loss we label k˜ as 1, and the corresponding cycle as C.
From the reasoning above it follows that for z′′ = (z+z′)2 , an efficient allocation, there is a cycle
in Γ(z′′). Then the argument in Section a). implies that u is not in U∗(N,A), as was to be proved.
6.2 Lemma 2
Case of goods. Fix Q, U, z as in statement i) and (5). We set pa = uiaUi for all i such that zia > 0
and note that p · zi = 1 for all i. For all a such that zia = 0 we have uiaUi ≤ pa: therefore zi is agent
i’s Walrasian demand at price p, and z is a competitive allocation.
Conversely let z ∈ Φ(N,A) and p meet (2). Recall U  0 because each agent i likes at least one
good. If pa = 0 then nobody likes good a (if uia > 0 then i’s demand is infinite, a contradiction
of (2)) and system (5) holds for a. Consider now the support A∗ of pa. Because zi is i’s demand
at price p the ratio uiapa is a constant pii over the support of zi, and we have:
∑
A∗ uiazia =
pii(
∑
A∗ pazia) =⇒ pii = Ui. So uiaUi = pa whenever i consumes a and uibUi ≤ pb if i does not eat
any b, as required by system (5). Note that this argument implies that the competitive price p is
unique.
Case of bads. Fix Q, U, z meeting (6) and U  0. Define A0 = {a ∈ A|uia = 0 for some i ∈ N}
and set pa = 0 for those bads. By (6) the bads in A
0 can only be eaten by agents who don’t mind
them: zia > 0 =⇒ uia = 0. Next in the restriction of Q to AA0 the same utility profile U is still
feasible, strictly positive, and meets (6). Like in the above argument we set pa =
uia
Ui
for all i who
eat some a, and check that we have constructed a competitive price in the sense of Definition 4.
For the converse statement, recall that (3), (4) together imply U  0, and mimic the argument
in the case of goods.
6.3 Proposition 2
Statement i) the F c for goods is Resource Monotonic.
We first generalize the definition of F c, f c to problems where the endowment ωa of each good is ar-
bitrary, and let the reader check that the system (5) capturing the optimal allocations f c(N,A, ω, u)
is unchanged. Then we fix N,A, u, ω, ω′ such that ω ≤ ω′. We assume without loss of general-
ity that u contains no null row or column (all agents are interested and all goods are useful).For
λ ∈ [0, 1] we write ωλ = (1− λ)ω + λω′, and for every forest Γ in N ×A we define
B(Γ) = {λ ∈ [0, 1]|∃z ∈ f c(N,A, ωλ, u) : Γ(z) = Γ}
Note that B(Γ) can be empty or a singleton, but if it is not, then it is an interval. To see this take
z ∈ f c(ωλ), z′ ∈ f c(ωλ′) such that Γ(z) = Γ(z′). For any ω′′ = (1 − µ)ωλ + µωλ′ the allocation
z′′ = (1−µ)z+µz′ is feasible, z′′ ∈ Φ(N,A, ω′′), the forest Γ(z′′) is unchanged, and the system (6),
which holds at z and z′, also holds at z′′. Thus z′′ ∈ f c(ω′′) and the claim is proven.
Next we check that inside an interval B(Γ) the rule F c is resource monotonic. The forest Γ is
a union of trees. If a tree contains a single agent i, she eats (in full) the same subset of goods for
any λ in B(Γ), hence her utility increases weakly in λ. If a sub-tree of Γ connects the subset S of
agents, then system (6) fixes the direction of the utility profile (Ui)i∈S , because along a path of Γ
the equalities uiaUi =
uja
Uj
ensure that all ratios UiUj are independent of λ in B(Γ). As λ increases in
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B(Γ) the agents in S together eat the same subset of goods, therefore the Ui-s increase weakly by
efficiency.
Finally Lemma 1 implies that the finite set of intervals B(Γ) cover [0, 1]. On each true interval
(not a singleton) the utility profile Uλ = F (N,A, ωλ, u) and there is at most a finite set of isolated
points not contained in any true interval. Moreover the mapping λ → Uλ is continuous because
ω → U(ω) is (an easy consequence of Berge Theorem). The desired conclusion U(ω) ≤ U(ω′)
follows.
Remark: Sziklai and Segal-Halevi ([23]) prove that the Competitive solution is Resource Monotonic
in the general cake-division problem, which implies statement i) in Theorem 2. They show that
as the cake increases the (normalized) price of the old cake goes down, a different proof technique
than ours.
Statement ii) First we repeat the argument in Subsection 7.2 of [1], focusing on a simple
two-person, two-bad example. Suppose the efficient rule F meets RM and FSG and consider the
problem
Q =
bads a b
u1 1 4
u2 4 1
Set U = F (Q). Because (1, 1) is an efficient disutility profile and F is efficient, one Ui is bounded
above by 1, say U1 ≤ 1. Then we define
Q′ =
bads 19a b
u1 1/9 4
u2 4/9 1
(where we treat 19a as a whole bad) and pick z
′ ∈ f(Q′). By FSG and feasibility:
z′2b ≤ u2 · z′2 ≤ u2 · (
1
2
eA
′
) =
13
18
=⇒ z′1b ≥
5
18
=⇒ u1 · z′1 = U ′1 ≥
10
9
> U1
contradicting RM.
We generalize the example , first to the case where n = 2n′ is even, n′ ≥ 2. Fix two bads a, b.
At Q we have n′ agents with ui = (1, 5n′), i ∈ N1, and n′ agents with uj = (5n′, 1), j ∈ N2. The
profile U = 1n′ e
N is feasible. Also, at an efficient profile if at least one in N1 eats some b, then no
one in N2 eats any a, and vice versa. Thus at U = F (Q) at least one of UN1 ≤ 1 or UN2 ≤ 1 is
true, say UN1 ≤ 1. Then define Q′ = ( 110n′ a, b) and use again FSG and feasibility:
for j ∈ N2: z′jb ≤ uj · z′j ≤ uj · (
1
2n′
eA
′
) =
3
4n′
=⇒
∑
i∈N1
z′ib ≥
1
4
=⇒ U ′N1 ≥
5
4
n′ > UN1
This contradicts RM. The case n = 2n′ + 1 odd is very similar, except that the two groups are of
size n′ and n′ + 1, with the same utilities as above. If we have more than two bads, say c, d, . . .,
we assume their disutilities are very small with respect those for a, b.
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6.4 Lemma 4
We give the proof in the case of bads, because the definition of the egalitarian allocation is simpler
in this case. We omit the slightly more involved argument for goods, where we must deal with the
leximin ordering (Definition 3).
We fix Q, and u′i as in the statement of the Lemma, in particular Γ(z′) = Γ(z). Set
λ =
uj · zj
uj · eA for all j ; λ
′ =
u′i · z′i
u′i · eA
=
uj · z′j
uj · eA for all j 6= i
Inequalities (9) (reversed for bads!) imply
µ =
u′i · zi
u′i · eA
>
ui · zi
ui · eA = λ
because the ratio increases when we first increase uia to u
′
ia on i’s winning bids (the rest of the
numerator is not larger than the rest of the denominator), then again when we decrease uia to u
′
ia
on i’s losing bids. Next we assume λ′ ≥ µ and derive a contradiction. It implies
uj · z′j ≥ (uj · eA)µ > (uj · eA)λ = uj · zj for all j 6= i
and u′i · z′i ≥ u′i · zi; together these inequalities contradict the efficiency of z′ at (u′i, u−i). Therefore
λ′ < µ and u′i · z′i < u′i · zi. Finally Γ(z′) = Γ(z) implies that a winning (resp. losing) bid at z
remains winning (resp. losing) at z′, so that u′i · z′i − ui · z′i = u′i · zi − ui · zi and ui · z′i < ui · zi
follows as desired.
6.5 Proposition 3
We already checked that the rule f c meets ILB; also ETE and FSG are clear. Conversely we fix f
meeting EFF, ETE or FSG, and ILB and an arbitrary problem Q = (N,A, u), where A contains
goods or bads. In the proof we consider several problems (N,A, v) where v varies in RN×A+ , and
for simplicity we write f(v) in lieu of f(N,A, v).
We pick z ∈ f c(u) and check that z ∈ f(u) as well. Set Ui = ui · zi and let p be the competitive
price at z. In the proof of Lemma 2 we saw that pa =
uia
Ui
for all i such that zia > 0, and for all
j we have pa ≥ ujaUj (resp. pa ≤
uja
Uj
) if we divide goods (resp. bads). Moreover p · zi = 1 for all i,
and p · eA = n.
Consider the problem Q∗ = (N,A,w) where wi = p for all i. The equal split allocation is
efficient in Q∗ therefore ETE implies F (w) = eN and so does FSG, because p · ( 1neA) = 1. Now
if we set w˜i = Uip the scale invariance property of F (Definition 2) gives F (w˜) = U ; moreover
z ∈ f(w˜) because w˜i · z = Ui for all i. If zia > 0 we have uia = Uipa = w˜ia; if zia = 0 we have
similarly uia ≤ w˜ia for the goods case, or uia ≥ w˜ia if bads. Apply finally ILB: after lowering (for
goods) or raising (for bads) every lost bid w˜ia to uia, the allocation z is still in f(u), as desired. 
Finally we check that ILB is in fact a weaker form of Maskin Monotonicity (MM). We do this
in the case of bads only, as both cases are similar. Individual allocations zi vary in [0, 1]
A and
utilities in RA+, so the MM axiom for rule f means that for any two problems Q,Q′ on N,A and
z ∈ f(Q) we have
{∀i ∈ N, ∀w ∈ [0, 1]A ui · zi ≤ ui · w =⇒ u′i · zi ≤ u′i · w} =⇒ z ∈ f(Q′) (15)
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We fix Q, i ∈ N and z ∈ f(Q), and for ε = 0, 1 we write Aε = {a|zia = ε} and A+ = A(A0∪A1).
The implication in the premises of (15) reads
∀w ∈ [0, 1]A ui · (w − zi) ≥ 0 =⇒ u′i · (w − zi) ≥ 0
The cone generated by the vectors w− zi when w covers [0, 1]A is C = {δ ∈ RA|δa ≥ 0 for a ∈ A0,
δa ≤ 0 for a ∈ A1}. By Farkas Lemma the implication {∀δ ∈ C : ui · δ ≥ 0 =⇒ u′i · δ ≥ 0} means
that, up to a scaling factor,
u′ia = uia on A
+ ; u′ia ≥ uia on A0 ; u′ia ≤ uia on A1
Thus MM says that after lowering a lost bid, or increasing a winning one, the initial allocation will
remain in the selected set. Now ILB only considers raising a lost bid, so it is only “half” of MM.
The Competitive rule does not meet the other half of MM.
6.6 Theorem 1
Statement i) Fix Q and recall from Lemma 1 that each U ∈ F c(Q) is strictly positive and
achieved some z ∈ f c(Q) such that Γ(z) is a forest. There are finitely many (bipartite) forests
in N × A therefore it is enough to check that to each forest Γ corresponds at most one U in
F c(Q). Consider a tree T in Γ with vertices N0, A0. If agents i, j ∈ N0 are both linked to a ∈ A0,
system (6) implies that Ui, Uj are proportional to uia, uja . Repeating this observation along the
paths of T we see that the profile (Ui)i∈N0 is determined up to a multiplicative constant. Now in
total the agents in N0 consume exactly A0 so by efficiency we cannot have two distinct (Ui)i∈N0
meeting (6).7
Statement ii) Case 1: n > m. We adapt the canonical example before Theorem 1 as follows.
For agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, set as before uiai = 1, uiaj = 3 for j 6= i, and for agents m + 1 to n pick
uia = 1 for all a. Then for any q, 1 ≤ q ≤ n− 1, the allocation
zi =
m
n
eai for 1 ≤ i ≤ q ; zj = eaj for q + 1 ≤ j ≤ m
zj =
1
n
e{a1,··· ,aq} for m+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n
generalizing (11), is still competitive.
Case 2: m = n+ 1. We use the following example
bad a1 · · · · · · an an+1
u1 1 3 3 3 1
· · · 3 1 3 3 1
· · · 3 3 1 3 1
un 3 3 3 1 1
7Note that the finiteness result holds even if we drop requirement (4) in Definition 3 but still insist that a
competitive allocation be efficient. If A0 is the set of bads a such that uia = 0 for some i, then some items in A
0 can
have a positive price, and be eaten by agents who do not mind them, eat only in A0, and enjoy a disutility of zero;
while the other bads in A0 have zero price, are also eaten by agents who do not mind them but those agents eat
also some real bads in AA0. For each such partition of A0 there are finitely many competitive disutility profiles.
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For any subset of agents N∗ ⊆ N the allocation where those agents share equally the bad n + 1,
while bad ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n goes to agent i, is competitive with prices pan+1 = pai = n
∗
n∗+1 for i ∈ N∗,
paj = 1 for j ∈ NN∗.
For the case m > n we take a disutility matrix with m− n copies of the last column. We omit
the details as well as the easy argument for the case n = m.
Statement iii) and oddness of |F c(Q)| We fix Q =({1, 2}, A, u). We label the bads k ∈
{1, · · · ,m} so that the ratios u1ku2k increase weakly in k, with the convention 10 =∞.
Step 1. Suppose u1ku2k =
u1(k+1)
u2(k+1)
. If p is a competitive price we have
pk
pk+1
=
uik
ui(k+1)
for i = 1, 2 (16)
Indeed if one of i = 1, 2 eats both k and k + 1, (16) follows by the linearity of preferences, If on
the contrary i eats bad k and j eats bad k + 1, then (6) gives uikpk ≥
ui(k+1)
pk+1
and
uj(k+1)
pk+1
≥ ujkpk .
So for a given amount of money spent by i on bads k and k + 1, she gets the same disutility
no matter how she splits this expense between the two bads. Hence an interval of competitive
allocations obtains by shifting the consumption of k and k + 1 while keeping the total expense on
these two bads fixed for each agent. They all give the same disutility profile and use the same
price. So if we merge k and k + 1 into a bad k∗ with disutilities uik∗ = uik + ui(k+1), all the
allocations z ∈ f c(Q) become a single competitive allocation for the new price pk∗ = pk + pk+1,
with p unchanged elsewhere. When we successively merge all the bads sharing the same ratio u1ku2k ,
the number |F c(Q)| does not change, and we reach a problem with fewer bads where the ratios
u1k
u2k
increase strictly in k. So we only need to prove the statement in this case.
Step 2. Efficiency means that if 1 eats some k and 2 some k′, then k ≤ k′. In particular the agents
split at most one bad, and efficient allocations z are of two types. In a k/k+ 1-cut 1 eats all bads
` ∈ {1, · · · , k} while 2 eats all ` ∈ {k + 1, · · · ,m}; in a k-split 1 and 2 share bad k, while bads
` ∈ {1, · · · , k − 1} go to 1, and ` ∈ {k + 1, · · · ,m} to 2.
By Definition 4 if the k/k + 1-cut is in f c(Q), its (normalized) price is
p` =
u1`
U1(k)
for ` ≤ k ; p` = u2`
U2(k + 1)
for ` ≥ k + 1
where we use the notation U1(k) =
∑k
1 u1`, U2(k) =
∑m
k u2`. System (6) has two parts: agent 1’s
demand at this price is e{1,··· ,k}:
{u1`
p`
≤ u1`′
p`′
for all ` ≤ k < k + 1 ≤ `′} ⇐⇒ U1(k)
U2(k + 1)
≤ u1(k+1)
u2(k+1)
and agent 2’s demand is e{k+1,··· ,m}:
{u2`′
p`′
≤ u2`
p`
for all ` ≤ k < k + 1 ≤ `′} ⇐⇒ u1k
u2k
≤ U1(k)
U2(k + 1)
Thus the k/k + 1-cut is in f c(Q) if and only
u1k
u2k
≤ U1(k)
U2(k + 1)
≤ u1(k+1)
u2(k+1)
(17)
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We turn to a k-split allocation. If it is competitive, by Definition 4 the corresponding non
normalized price is
p` =
u1`
u1k
for ` ≤ k − 1 ; pk = 1 ; p` = u2`
u2k
for ` ≥ k + 1
and the inequalities u1`p` ≤
u1`′
p`′
and u2`′p`′
≤ u2`p` hold by construction for ` ≤ k ≤ `′. To reach a
competitive allocation it suffices to find a split of bad k for which z1 and z2 have the same cost:
{
k−1∑
1
p` + x = 1− x+
m∑
k+1
p`′ for some x ∈]0, 1[} ⇐⇒ |U1(k − 1)
u1k
− U2(k + 1)
u2k
| < 1 (18)
Note that for k = 1 inequalities (18) reduce to U2(2) < u21, and for k = m to U1(m− 1) < u1m.
We see that for each k there is at most one k-split allocation in f c(Q). So |F c(Q)| is at most
2m− 1, because the maximal number of k/k + 1-cuts and k-split allocations is respectively m− 1
and m.
Step 3. We use the notation (x)+ = max{x, 0} to give an example where this bound is achieved:
u1k = 2
(k−2)+ for 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 ; u1m = 2m−2 + 1
u21 = 2
m−2 + 1 ; u2k = 2(m−1−k)+ for 2 ≤ k ≤ m
Check first U1(k − 1) = u1k and U2(k + 1) = u2k for 2 ≤ k ≤ m − 1; also U2(2) = U1(m − 1) =
2m−2 < u21 = u1m so (18) holds for all k. Next
U1(k)
U2(k+1)
=
u1(k+1)
u2k
for 2 ≤ k ≤ m− 2, so that (17)
is clear for such k. And (17) holds as well for k = 1,m− 1.
This example is clearly robust: small perturbations of the disutility matrix preserve |F c(Q)|.
Step 4. Oddness of |F c(Q)|. Recall that F c(Q) is the set of critical points of the Nash product
in Ψeff (Q).The k/k + 1-cut allocations are the extreme points of the set of feasible allocations
Φ(N,A), and their utility profiles are the extreme points8 of Ψeff (Q) if the ratios u1ku2k increase
strictly in k. Excluding the set of utility profiles u such that |U1(k−1)u1k −
U2(k+1)
u2k
| = 1 (see (18)),
it follows that the k/k + 1 cut is competitive if and only if it is a local minimum of N . On the
other hand the utility profile of a k-split allocation is on a one-dimensional face of Ψeff (Q), and
is competitive if and only if it is a local maximum of N . Then the statement follows from the fact
that if a continuous non-negative function on the interval is zero at the end-points, the number of
its local maxima exceeds the number of its local minima (different than the end-points) by one:
the extrema alternate and the closest to the end-points are the maxima.
Note that the above argument implies that in a typical problem with two agents, if |F c(Q)| = 1
then the competitive allocation is a k/k+ 1-split, and if |F c(Q)| ≥ 2, at least one k-cut allocation
is competitive.
Statement iv) and oddness of |F c(Q)| We fix Q =(N, {a, b}, u) and label the agents i ∈
{1, · · · , n} in such a way that the ratios uiauib increase weakly in i.
Step 1. Assume that the sequence uiauib increases strictly. If z is an efficient allocation, then for all
i, j {zia > 0 and zjb > 0} implies i ≤ j. In particular at most one agent is eating both goods,
and we have two types of efficient and envy-free allocations. The i/i + 1-cut zi/i+1 is defined for
8An U ∈ Ψeff (Q) is extreme if it is not between two other points of Ψeff (Q).
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1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 by: zi/i+1j = ( 1i , 0) for j ≤ i, and zi/i+1j = (0, 1n−i ) for j ≥ i+1. Next for 2 ≤ i ≤ n−1
the allocation z is an i-split if there are numbers x, y such that
zj = (
1− x
i− 1 , 0) for j ≤ i− 1 ; zj = (0,
1− y
n− i ) for j ≥ i+ 1 (19)
zi = (x, y) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
i
, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
n− i+ 1 (20)
Also, z is a 1-split if z1 = (1, y) and zj = (0,
1−y
n−1 ) for j ≥ 2; and z is a n-split if zn = (x, 1) and
zj = (
1−x
n−1 , 0) for j ≤ n− 1. Note that the cut zi/i+1 is both an i-split and an i+ 1-split.
If the sequence uiauib increases strictly, it is clear that an efficient and envy-free allocation must
be an i-split. In the next Step we show that this is still true, welfare-wise, if that sequence increases
only weakly, then we provide a full characterization in Step 3.
Step 2. Assume the sequence uiauib increases only weakly, for instance
uia
uib
=
u(i+1)a
u(i+1)b
. Then if z is
efficient and envy-free we may have z(i+1)a > 0 and zib > 0, however we can find z
′ delivering the
same disutility profile and such that one of z′(i+1)a and z
′
ib is zero. Indeed No Envy and the fact
that ui and ui+1 are parallel gives ui · zi = ui · zi+1 and ui+1 · zi+1 = ui+1 · zi, from which the
claim follows easily. We conclude that the i-split allocations contain, utility-wise, all efficient and
envy-free allocations.
Step 3. If the cut zi/i+1 is in f c(Q), the corresponding price is p = (i, n − i), and the system (6)
reads
uja
i ≤ ujbn−i for j ≤ i, ujbn−i ≤ ujai for j ≥ i+ 1, which boils down to
uia
uib
≤ i
n− i ≤
u(i+1)a
u(i+1)b
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 (21)
For 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 if the i-split allocation z (19) is in f c(Q), the (normalized) price must be
p = n( uiauia+uib ,
uib
uia+uib
) and each agent must be spending exactly 1:
pa
1− x
i− 1 = pb
1− y
n− i = pax+ pby = 1
which gives
x =
1
nuia
((n− i+ 1)uia − (i− 1)uib) ; y =
1
nuib
(iuib − (n− i)uia) (22)
We let the reader check that these formulas are still valid when i = 1 or i = n− 1.
An i-split allocation z is strict if it is not a cut, which happens if and only if both x, y in (19)
are strictly positive. By (22), for any i ∈ {1, · · · , n} there is a strict i-split allocation that is
competitive if and only if
i− 1
n− i+ 1 <
uia
uib
<
i
n− i (23)
(with the convention 10 =∞).
Step 4. Counting competitive allocations. There are at most n competitive (strict) i-split allo-
cations, and n − 1 cuts zi/i+1, hence the upper bound 2n − 1. An example where the bound is
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achieved uses any sequence uiauib meeting (23) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, as these inequalities imply (21)
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1}.
Step 5. Oddness of |F c(Q)|. For the utility profiles such that all the inequalities (21) and (23)
are strict, we draw the two sequences uiauib and
i
n−i on the real line. Clearly the left-most and the
right-most competitive allocations must be splits: if there is no competitive i-split allocation for
1 ≤ i ≤ i∗ then (23) gives successively u1au1b > 1n−1 , then u2au2b > 2n−2 , · · · ,
ui∗a
ui∗b
> i
∗
n−i∗ , hence the
i∗/i∗ + 1-cut is not competitive. Similarly one checks that between two adjacent competitive split
allocations there is exactly one competitive cut allocation.
6.7 Proposition 4
Step 1 the case m = 2
As in the previous proof we fix a problem (N, {a, b}, u) where the ratios ri = uiauib increase strictly
in i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. We write Si for the closed rectangle of i-split allocations (19), (20): we have
Si ∩ Si+1 = {zi/i+1} for i = 1, · · · , n − 1, and Si ∩ Sj = ∅ if i and j are not adjacent. We saw
that envy-free and efficient allocations must be in the connected union of rectangles B = ∪ni=1Si.
Writing EF for the set of envy-free allocations, we describe now the connected components of
A = B ∩ EF . Clearly the set of corresponding disutility profiles has the same number of connected
components.
We let the reader check that the cut zi/i+1 is envy-free (EF) if and only if it is competitive, i.
e. inequalities (21) hold, that we rewrite as:
ri ≤ i
n− i ≤ ri+1 (24)
If zi/i+1 is EF then both Si ∩ EF and Si+1 ∩ EF are in the same component of A as zi/i+1,
because they are convex sets containing zi/i+1. If both zi−1/i and zi/i+1 are EF, so is the interval
[zi−1/i, zi/i+1]; then these two cuts as well as Si ∩ EF are in the same component of A. And if
zi/i+1 is EF but zi−1/i is not, then the component of A containing zi/i+1 is disjoint from any
component of A in ∪i−11 Sj (if any), because Si ∩ ∪i−11 Sj = {zi−1/i}; a symmetrical statement
holds if zi−1/i is EF but zi/i+1 is not.
Finally if Si ∩ EF 6= ∅ while neither zi−1/i nor zi/i+1 is in EF , the convex set Si ∩ EF is a
connected component of A because it is disjoint from Si−1 ∩EF and Si+1 ∩EF , and all three sets
are compact. In this case we speak of an interior component of A. We claim that Si contains an
interior component if and only if
i− 1
n− i+ 1 < ri−1 < ri < ri+1 <
i
n− i (25)
where for i = 1 this reduces to the two right-hand inequalities, and for i = n to the two left-hand
ones. The claim is proven in the next Step.
Now consider a problem with the following configuration:
r1 < r2 <
1
n− 1 <
3
n− 3 < r3 < r4 < r5 <
4
n− 4 <
<
6
n− 6 < r6 < r7 < r8 <
7
n− 7 <
9
n− 9 · · ·
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γ
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Γ∗
δ
γ
∆∗ Γ
∗
Figures 3A, 3B, 3C
By inequalities (24) we have zi/i+1 ∈ EF for i = 3q−1, and 1 ≤ q ≤ bn3 c, and no two of those cuts
are adjacent so they belong to distinct components. Moreover Si contains an interior component
of A for i = 3q − 2, and 1 ≤ q ≤ bn+23 c, and only those. So the total number of components of A
is bn3 c+ bn+23 c = b 2n+13 c as desired.
We let the reader check that we cannot reach a larger number of components.
Step 2: {Si contains an interior component} ⇐⇒ {inequalities (25) hold}
Pick z ∈ Si as in (19), (20) and note first that for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, the envy-freeness inequalities
reduce to just four inequalities: agents i− 1 and i do not envy each other, and neither do agents i
and i+ 1 (we omit the straightforward argument). Formally
1
ri+1
(
1
n− i −
n− i+ 1
n− i y) ≤ x ≤
1
ri
(
1
n− i −
n− i+ 1
n− i y) (26)
ri−1(
1
i− 1 −
i
i− 1x) ≤ y ≤ ri(
1
i− 1 −
i
i− 1x) (27)
In the (non negative) space (x, y) define the lines ∆(λ): y = λ( 1i−1 − ii−1x) and Γ(µ): x =
µ( 1n−i− n−i+1n−i y). As shown on Figure 3 when λ varies ∆(λ) pivots around δ = ( 1i , 0), corresponding
to zi/i+1, and similarly Γ(µ) pivots around γ = (0, 1n−i+1 ), corresponding to z
i−1/i. The above
inequalities say that (x, y) is in the cone ∆∗ of points below ∆(ri) and above ∆(ri−1), and also in
the cone Γ∗ below Γ( 1ri ) and above Γ(
1
ri+1
). Thus δ ∈ Γ∗ if and only if zi/i+1 is EF, and γ ∈ ∆∗
if and only if zi−1/i is EF. If neither of these is true γ is above or below ∆∗ on the vertical axis
and δ is to the left or to the right of Γ∗ the horizontal axis. But if γ is below ∆∗ while δ is right
of Γ∗, the two cones do not intersect and Si ∩ EF = ∅; ditto if γ is above ∆∗ while δ is left of Γ∗
(see Figures 3A,3B,3C). Moreover γ above ∆∗ and δ right of Γ∗ is impossible as it would imply
1
n− i+ 1 >
ri
i− 1 and
1
i
>
1
ri(n− i)
a contradiction. We conclude that {Si ∩ EF 6= ∅ and zi−1/i, zi/i+1 /∈ EF} holds if and only if γ is
below ∆∗ and δ is to the left of Γ∗, which is exactly the system (25).
In the case i = 1 the EF property of z reduces to (26) and the i-split allocation has x = 1. If
r1 >
1
n−1 the right-hand inequality in (26) is impossible with x = 1, therefore r1 <
1
n−1 ; but then
the fact that z1/2 is not EF gives (see (24)) r2 <
1
n−1 as desired. A similar argument applies for
the case i = n.
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Step 3: general m
Fix a problem (N, {a, b}, u) with d 2n+13 e connected components as in Step 1. Given any m ≥ 3,
construct a problem (N, A˜, u˜) with A˜ = {a, b1, · · · , bm−1} and for all agents i
u˜ia = uia ; u˜ibk =
1
m− 1uib for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1
The bads bk are smaller size clones of b. If some z˜ is efficient and EF in the new problem, then
the following allocation z is efficient and EF in the initial problem:
zib =
m−1∑
1
z˜ibk ; zia = z˜ia
and z, z˜ deliver the same disutility profile. Therefore in the two problems the sets of efficient and
EF allocations have the same number of components.
6.8 Theorem 2
Fix a single-valued, efficient rule f meeting NE. Assume first n = 4, m = 2. Consider Q1 where,
with the notation in the previous proof, we have
r1 < r2 <
1
3
< 1 < 3 < r3 < r4
By (24) and (25) A has three components: one interior to S1 (excluding the cut z1/2), one
around z2/3 intersecting S2 and S3, and one interior to S4 excluding z3/4. Assume without loss
that f selects an allocation in the second or third component just listed, and consider Q2 where
r1, r2 are unchanged but the new ratios r
′
3, r
′
4 are
r1 < r2 < 3 < r
′
3 < 1 < r
′
4 <
1
3
Here, again by (24) and (25), A has a single component interior to S1, the same as in Q1: none
of the cuts zi/i+1 is in A anymore, and there is no component interior to another Si. When we
decrease continuously r3, r4 to r
′
3, r
′
4, the allocation z
1/2 remains outside A and the component
interior to S1 does not move. Therefore the allocation selected by f cannot vary continuously in
the ratios ri, or in the underlying disutility matrix u.
We can clearly construct a similar pair of problems to prove the statement when n ≥ 5 and
m = 2. And for the case m ≥ 3 we use the cloning technique in Step 3 of the previous proof.
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